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Pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will: Gramsci’s political thought in the 
last miscellaneous notebooks
Abstract: 
In the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci combines a “pessimistic” analysis of the growing 
authoritarian trends of the 1930s with an “optimistic” commitment to the potential for 
socialist transformation and the elaboration of an effective strategy for the workers’ 
movement. By discussing key texts from the miscellaneous notebooks 14, 15, and 17, I 
investigate the way in which, in the last phase of his work in prison, Gramsci interprets 
the changing political and social dynamics that characterise “western” countries (and 
that are central, mutatis mutandis, also in present-day politics). In particular, I focus on 
the complex conceptual cluster elaborated by Gramsci (with the categories of 
“bureaucracy”, “police”, “discipline” and “political party”) in order to illustrate the way 
in which he explains the transformations of the mechanisms of political participation, 
and the new, “totalitarian” forms of political engagement of his own times, as well as 
their possible solutions. 
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Article text:
1. Introduction
“Pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will” is one of the most famous sayings 
attributed to Gramsci, inspired by a similar formula of the French writer Romain 
Rolland.1 It appears in Antonio Gramsci’s works in a particular sense: to describe the 
(seemingly contradictory) coexistence of, on the one hand, a realistic description of the 
status quo and, on the other hand, a genuine commitment to the possibility of 
transforming reality. This expression recurs more frequently in his pre-prison writings, 
but it is used also in Gramsci’s prison letters as well as in his Prison Notebooks.2 
I would argue, however, that its significance reaches far beyond its explicit occurrences.
It can be said that this formula reflects the core of Gramsci’s project – a project in which
a realistic approach to the actual state of things is combined with a commitment to and a
belief in the socialist revolution. In particular, I think that this expression can be 
fruitfully used to interpret his political thought as it unfolds in the last phase of 
Gramsci’s creative work in prison, which corresponds to notebooks 14, 15 and 17. 
1“Pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will” is indeed a motto created by Romain
Rolland, and not by Gramsci, who expanded and developed the initial phrase, according
to his technique of adopting a previously existing category and giving it a new and 
richer meaning. On this conceptual ‘strategy’, cf. Showstack Sassoon 1990. Gramsci 
adopts first this formula in the article “Address to the Anarchists” [Discorso agli 
anarchici], published in L’Ordine Nuovo, 3-10 April 1920 (cf. Gramsci 1977, p. 188). 
He explicitly attributes it to Rolland, who used it a few days before, in the review of 
The sacrifice of Abraham by Raymond Lefebvre (Paris, Flammarion, 1919; the review 
appeared in L’Humanité, 19 March 1920). On this source, cf. Gramsci 1994, vol. 1, 300,
n. 1. 
2On this famous expression by Gramsci, cf. for instance Frosini 1995 and Prestipino 
2006. As to more general instances of this formula, cf. Showstack Sassoon 1999 and, 
more recently, Panitch 2016. 
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In fact, the context of the years 1933-1935 is from many points of view different to that 
of the early 1930s, and it is even more clearly distinct from that of the 1920s and, 
evidently, of the First World War and pre-war period. As a consequence of the 
authoritarian drift taking place in Europe (cf. the growing strength of Mussolini’s 
dictatorship in Italy and the establishment of the Nazi regime in Germany) as well as of 
the changing features of international socialism (the situation in Russia plays an obvious
role), both society and state are taking previously unseen forms. The borders between 
society and the state become increasingly blurred and the pursuit of hegemony follows 
new, totalitarian pathways.3 To investigate these deeply changed political and social 
dynamics represents a challenge for Gramsci, who adapts his categories to this new 
context. The result is an intriguing (and open-ended) reflection on contemporary politics
that, while aware of the increasingly tragic and negative aspects of reality, does not give
up on the project of socialist revolution. 
2. The last miscellaneous notebooks 14, 15, and 17
As pointed out by Gianni Francioni, notebooks 14, 15 and 17 are “miscellaneous” 
notebooks, that means notebooks that gather notes on different topics, in opposition to 
the so called “special” or “monographic” notebooks, in which Gramsci transcribes and 
thematically organises the notes previously written.4 These notebooks continue the 
“chain” of miscellaneous notebooks identified by Francioni, since Notebook 14 is the 
3On Gramsci’s analysis of the European political scene of the 1930s, cf. Potier 1999, 
Vacca 2012 and Rossi 2017. 
4As to the distinction between “miscellaneous”, “special” and “mixed” notebooks, cf. 
the introduction by Francioni in Gramsci 2009, 21-60. For a detailed analysis of the 
physical features and of the themes developed in the notebooks, cf. the introduction to 
the single notebooks in the anastatic edition of the Prison Notebooks (Gramsci 2009). 
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successor of Notebook 9 (as it is known, notebooks 10, 11, 12 and 13 are special 
notebooks).5 As to their chronology, they have been dated between December 1932 and 
1935.6 
Generally speaking, scholarship has not paid much attention to the notes contained in 
these notebooks, with the partial exception of the texts on the category of passive 
revolution, developed largely in Notebook 15.7 That is due, in part, to the way in which 
Gramsci's thought was presented in the post-war period and its subsequent readings.8 
5According to the diachronic reading of the Prison Notebooks developed in recent 
decades by Gramsci scholars, the notebooks represent an uninterrupted and intertwined 
sequence of writings, in which (almost) every notebook has an antecedent and a 
successor. In particular, it is possible to retrace a “series” of miscellaneous notebooks 
(the “chain” mentioned above). The special notebooks, which can be divided into two 
groups, were written partially in parallel with the miscellaneous notebooks and they are 
the result of a plan of “systematisation” of the written material elaborated by Gramsci in
the Spring-Summer 1932. As Frosini 2003 has pointed out, we can trace three different 
phases in Gramsci’s works (first phase: mid-1929/first months of 1932; second phase: 
mid-1932/mid-1933; third phase: mid-1933/mid-1935): “the rupture between the second
and third phase is of a medical nature – the very serious crisis of 7 March 1933 – but 
that between the first and the second is of a theoretical nature” (Frosini 2003, 23; my 
translation). 
6On the chronology of the texts, cf. Cospito 2011, 881-904. Gramsci started notebooks 
14, 15 and 17 while in prison in Turi (Bari) and continued working on two of them 
(notebooks 14 and 17) at the clinic of Doctor Cusumano in Formia (nearby Latina, on 
the Mediterranean coast of Lazio), where he was transferred due to health reasons in 
December 1933 (he remained there until August 1935, when he was transferred again to
the clinic Quisisana in Rome, where he died in April 1937). On the connection between 
Gramsci’s biography and his work plans, cf. again Frosini 2003. Without going into the 
details of the philological discussion on these notebooks (whose chronology has been 
recently called into question by Gianni Francioni), their “liminal” character should be 
highlighted, i.e. the fact that they stay at a “threshold”, both in Gramsci’s thought (as I 
will try to illustrate in this paper) and in his personal life. 
7On this category, cf. Thomas 2006. For a reassessment of Gramsci’s conception of 
passive revolution, cf. Thomas 2018. 
8I refer to the first, thematic edition of Gramsci writings, which appeared between 
1948-1951 (on this edition, cf. Thomas 2009, passim). However, after the appearance of
the critical edition by Valentino Gerratana (Gramsci 1975), scholars focussed mainly on 
the special notebooks as well as on the first group of miscellaneous notebooks (1-9), 
that contain the first versions of the texts later redrafted in the special notebooks. 
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Another cause is represented by the heterogeneous nature of these notebooks and to 
their peculiar style of writing, often concise and even obscure.9
In spite of the “dispersed” character of these notes by Gramsci, I think that it is possible 
to identify in these notebooks a number of texts that deal with political issues broadly 
conceived, mostly under the headings Past and Present and Machiavelli. Moreover, 
within this group, articulated and consistent reflections on specific topics can be 
identified.10 
I would argue that, thanks to a careful exegesis of Gramsci’s texts, we can reconstruct 
his investigation of contemporary political dynamics, that develops further the analysis 
previously elaborated. Indeed, such an analysis would highlight the specific evolutions 
of Gramsci’s thought in the development of the Notebooks. In particular, I believe that 
such a reading could offer a new way to understand the evolution of Gramsci’s thinking 
about the nature of contemporary politics in the early/mid 1930s: if the miscellaneous 
notebooks 14, 15 and 17 are no doubt in continuity with the earlier notebooks, they 
represent also a significant “new beginning”, by opening a new (and, due to obvious 
reasons, incomplete) phase of Gramsci’s reflection on politics in the Prison Notebooks –
even in comparison, for instance, to notes written just beforehand, or almost at the same 
time, like the notes of Notebook 13. 
In this essay I shall try to outline the main aspects of the political reflection elaborated 
by Gramsci in these last miscellaneous notebooks, by relying on the ongoing 
philological work on the critical edition of Gramsci’s writings and on the scholarship’s 
9It should be remembered that Gramsci had been in jail since 1927 and that his health 
was worsening (on Gramsci’s life in prison, cf. Vacca 2012). 
10Due to reasons of space, the analysis provided here will be limited to a few themes 
developed by Gramsci. 
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most recent achievements. In the first place, I will describe the main coordinates of 
Gramsci’s analysis of contemporary politics (§ 3), by highlighting its totalitarian 
features (§ 4). Then the focus will be on the conception of hegemony that emerges in 
these notebooks and on the “democratic-bureaucratic” nature of modern regimes; I will 
concentrate more specifically on the issue of bureaucracy (§ 5) as well as on the police 
(§ 6), in order to show the new, enlarged functions of these organisations. The 
counterpart of such a reflection is represented by the analysis of Gramsci’s conception 
of discipline (§ 7) in which emerges his attempt to rethink successfully the current 
political and social dynamics. I will conclude by dwelling on Gramsci’s theory of the 
party and by sketching the different levels of analysis embedded in his observations on 
political parties (§ 8). 
3. Modern times
Gramsci’s categories of hegemony, state, civil society and so on have been widely 
investigated by scholars, who have shown how his conception relies on a complex 
theoretico-political analysis as well as on a broader historical investigation.11 But which 
are the salient features of the modern state? And what is the specific role played by civil
society in the creation of a hegemonic relationship in Gramsci’s times? 
According to Gramsci, we can talk of a contemporary era (or “modern”, as he says), 
from the First World War onwards.12 This period is characterised by major changes that 
involve both the structural and the superstructural levels and that are the result of trends 
11Cf., among others, Thomas 2009 and Liguori 2015. 
12In fact, Gramsci adopts a quite peculiar historical terminology. He does not talk about
a “modern” age followed by “contemporary” history, but, instead, he distinguishes 
between a “pre-modern” and a “modern” era that goes up to his time; cf. in this regard 
Burgio 2014, 157-164.
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that can be traced back to the 1870s.13 In this context, the most relevant ones are no 
doubt the transformations within the capitalist system of production, the growing 
bureaucratisation of the State and the politicisation of the masses, that Gramsci widely 
investigates in his prison writings.
This last element, in particular, has a strong impact on the relationship between politics 
and civil society. The political dimension is not limited any more to the government, the
parliament or the traditional political parties; hegemony becomes a social issue, a 
project to be carried out (or an achievement to be maintained) on the terrain of civil 
society and through civil society.14 In the Prison Notebooks Gramsci reflects extensively
on this increasingly blurred distinction between State, conventionally understood as a 
synonym of political society, and civil society. He develops a new and original 
conception, effectively synthesised by the formula of the “integral State”.15 
The counterpart of this reflection is Gramsci’s famous military metaphor of the “war of 
position”, that describes modern political struggles, in opposition to the “war of 
movement”, that applies mostly to preceding historical epochs, but also to 
underdeveloped countries such as Russia.16 An essential part of Gramsci’s investigation 
of the war of position consists in the analysis of social practices and institutions outside 
the official state apparatus, practices and institutions that belong to the sphere of the 
civil society but have a strong political influence. As Gramsci writes, “the massive 
13However, such a general trend does not cancel the differences between the various 
national contexts (on Gramsci’s “plural temporalities”, cf. Thomas 2017a and Thomas 
2017b). 
14Cf. Frosini 2016b; on these themes, cf. also Antonini 2016. 
15Christine Buci-Glucksmann (1980 [1975]) coined the term “enlarged state” to 
describe the political weight of private institutions and organisations, by consciously 
recalling Gramscian terminology and concepts (however, Gramsci does not use the 
expression “enlarged state”, but only that of “integral state”). 
16On this topic, cf. in particular Egan 2016. 
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structures of the modern democracies, both as State organisations, and as complexes of 
associations in civil society, constitute for the art of politics as it were the ‘trenches’ and 
the permanent fortifications of the front in the war of position: they render merely 
‘partial’ the element of movement which before used to be ‘the whole’ of war, etc”.17
4. Totalitarian dynamics
This description of the war of position in Notebook 13, § 7 represents an excellent 
summary of Gramsci’s reflection on the topic. However, we can read this note also as a 
point of departure for a further exploration of the dynamics of hegemony in 
contemporary societies, as it develops in notebooks 14, 15 and 17.18 
It is not by chance, indeed, that Gramsci employs here the adjective “massive”, in order 
to characterise the structures of modern states.19 By doing this, he establishes a 
meaningful connection with his previous dominant use of the term, in relation to 
religious apparatuses (especially of the Catholic Church) and their strict relationship 
with the popular masses.20 
17Q 13, § 7; Gramsci 1999 [1971], 503. In the following pages I will refer to the Italian 
critical edition of the Prison Notebooks edited by Valentino Gerratana (Gramsci 1975) 
by indicating the number of the notebook (Q) and that of the paragraph (§). As regards 
the translations, I will rely on Gramsci 1985, 1992-1996, 1995, 1999 [1971]; when the 
English version of Gramsci’s text is not available, the translation is mine. 
18Chronologically speaking, the writing of Notebook 13 and of Notebook 14 partially 
overlaps: Gramsci worked on Notebook 13 during May 1932 and November 1933; 
Notebook 14 was started in December 1932 (cf. Cospito 2011). That explains some 
clear affinities between the notes of the special notebook on Machiavelli (especially 
since they go deeper than their first draft texts) and Notebook 14. 
19The expression “massive structures of the modern democracies” does not appear in 
the first draft text of this note, Q 8, § 52.  It is therefore a novelty that Gramsci 
introduces in this note of Notebook 13, that echoes Gramsci’s analysis of “totalitarian” 
trends in the last miscellaneous notebooks.
20Cf. Q 2, § 90; Q 5, § 134; Q 10, I, § 1. In modernity this adjective highlights instead 
the oppressive and repressive character of the ‘new’ bourgeois hegemony (cf. infra). 
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In the final miscellaneous notebooks Gramsci develops further this aspect, by focussing 
on the “totalitarian” dimension of modern states. First of all it should be noted that, in 
the Prison Notebooks, the adjective “totalitarian” is neutral in itself. Gramsci never uses
the term “totalitarianism” and he obviously does not share the current understanding of 
the term (following Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism, 1951); his account 
has to be contextualised within the early-twentieth century debate, in order to avoid 
undue anachronisms.21 “Totalitarian” describes here the effort of an ideology or of a 
group to become dominant and to destroy its opponents. In this sense “totalitarian” 
means simply “holistic”, “absolute” (vs “partial”).22 Being “totalitarian” is therefore a 
requirement for any political organisation that aims at becoming truly hegemonic, as 
Gramsci writes in Q 15, § 6: “hence the conclusion that in building a party, it is 
necessary to give it a ‘monolithic’ character rather than base it on secondary questions; 
therefore, painstaking care [must be taken] that there should be homogeneity between 
the leadership and the rank and file, between the leaders and their mass following”.23 
Thus, this principle, in itself neutral, constitutes an important part of the framework of 
historical materialism.24 However, Gramsci applies it also to contemporary dictatorships
(namely Fascism in Italy and Germany), in so far as it grasps some essential features of 
these systems.25 They “absolutise” their world-view and tend to completely absorb civil 
21On this point, cf. Petersen 1975.
22Cf., for instance, Q 1, § 139 or Q 6, § 188. It is noteworthy that also the adjective 
‘totalitarian’ (as ‘massive’) applies mostly to Catholicism in the Prison Notebooks. On 
the totalitarian dimension of ideologies see the entries Concezione del mondo (by G. 
Liguori) and Totalitario (by R. Caputo) in Liguori-Voza 2009, 148-149 and 851-853.
23Q 15, § 6; Gramsci 1999, 368; translation modified.
24Cf. Q 4, § 75; Gramsci 1992, 246: “historical materialism will have or may have this 
function which is not only totalitarian as a conception of the world, but it is also 
totalitarian in that it will permeate all of society down to its deepest roots”. 
25On totalitarian tendencies in Europe in the 1930s cf. Griffin 2005 and Roberts 2006; 
on Fascism, in particular, cf. Gentile 2008. 
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society in themselves, that means that they have a “totalising relationship” with civil 
society. Q 17, § 37 is illuminating from this point of view. Here Gramsci writes: 
the phenomenon reveals interesting aspects in countries where there is a 
single, totalitarian, governing party. For the functions of such a party are no 
longer directly political, but merely technical ones of propaganda and public
order, and moral and cultural influence. The political function is indirect. 
For, even if no other legal parties exist, other parties in fact always do exist 
and other tendencies which cannot be legally coerced; and, against these, 
polemics are unleashed and struggles are fought as in a game of blind man’s
buff. In any case it is certain that in such parties cultural functions 
predominate, which means that political language becomes jargon. In other 
words, political questions are disguised as cultural ones, and as such become
insoluble.26
The changes that occur on the level of civil society in a totalitarian framework are 
elsewhere defined by Gramsci as the “total and molecular (individual) transformation of
ways of thinking and acting”.27 From these words, it is clear that these transformations 
reflect meaningfully also on the ‘traditional’ political level (parliament/party), by 
generating a crisis of representation, and a shift from direct political action to a cultural 
and social intervention. 
26Q 17, § 37; Gramsci 1999, 355. 
27Q 17, § 51; Gramsci 1999, 540.
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5. Bureaucracy and hegemony
This new primacy of the cultural and social aspects corresponds to a reassessment of the
role of institutions like the bureaucracy and the police. As to the first one, if the 
reflection on the category develops already in the first notebooks, it acquires a new 
meaning on the background of these considerations on contemporary totalitarian 
politics.
First of all, from the summer 1932 onwards, the term “bureaucratic” has to be 
understood as opposed to “democratic”: this is the result of Gramsci’s reflection on the 
issue of centralism and on the functioning of the political party.28 In short, a 
“democratic” attitude reflects the real relationships among forces and promotes their 
development and transformation, through the passage of hegemony from one social 
group to another, coherently with the evolution of the political, social and economic 
dynamics. The “bureaucratic” attitude goes in the opposite direction, aiming at the 
preservation of a given order, whatever the conditions are.
However, the two tendencies cannot be separated, since the modern totalitarian regimes 
are in their very essence “democratic-bureaucratic”, as Fabio Frosini has pointed out.29 
That means that, even if the direction remains an indispensable element also in critical 
moments (whence the specific character of “struggle between hegemonies” of the 
current war of position), it must be achieved at the price of an unprecedented and 
28Cf. Frosini 2016a, 147. The category of “centralism” was particularly relevant in the 
Italian context, due to the use made of the expression “organic centralism” by Bordiga. 
On Gramsci’s account of centralism as well as on the changing meaning of the terms 
“democratic”, “organic” and “bureaucratic”, cf. Cospito 2016, 169 ff. 
29Frosini 2016a, 133; my translation. As for the expression “democratic-bureaucratic”, 
cf. also, for instance, Q 8, § 21. 
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“frantic” centralisation of forces, i.e. the progressive absorption by the state of all those 
elements of civil society able to educate the population and to organise the consensus.30 
In the framework of this new, “post-jacobin” hegemony,31 Gramsci’s historical and 
theoretical analysis of bureaucracy represents a Leitmotif. This theme is developed in 
many notes of Notebook 14. In § 38 Gramsci deals with the non-national character of 
the Italian bureaucracy, contrasting Italian bureaucratic centralism with French national 
centralisation (positively conceived): “in France there had been a unitary national 
movement, of which the centralisation was the bureaucratic expression. In Italy there 
was not the same national process, rather the centralized bureaucracy had hindered such 
a process”.32 A similar interpretation returns in § 47, where Gramsci compares Italy and 
Germany. Here Gramsci underlines how the German bureaucracy, historically belonging
to the Junker class, was connected to the rest of the social structure and thus 
collaborated in the creation and strengthening of the national state. On a more general 
level, Q 14, § 49 highlights the alternative between a form of bureaucracy intended as a 
“sclerotic” and conservative body and a form of bureaucracy that, instead, contributes 
positively to the politico-statal organisation. 
An analogous reasoning can be found also in § 62 and in § 69. Here Gramsci establishes
a significant opposition between “organisation” and “initiative” on the one hand, and 
bureaucracy on the other (“the truth in the latter case was that there was neither 
‘initiative’ nor ‘organization’ but merely bureaucracy and a fatalistic fad”;33 “why the 
30Frosini underlines also how this new form of hegemony implies a “broadening of the 
mass of intellectuals” and a “multiplication of their functions” (cf. Frosini 2016a, 135; 
my translation).
31This is a definition by Frosini (cf. Frosini 2016a).  
32Q 14, § 38, 1695; my translation.
33Q 14, § 62; Gramsci 1985, 405.
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organisation, that should boost the individual initiative, should transform it into a 
bureaucracy, that is to say, into the blockage of the individual forces?”34).
Thus, Gramsci develops in this notebook a conception of bureaucracy that goes beyond 
its simple identification with a specific state apparatus. Not only is bureaucracy 
connected explicitly to the analysis of the different components of society and to their 
interaction, but it also has an essential role in the creation and the establishment of 
hegemony, since it influences the entire state organisation (in a positive sense or, more 
frequently, in a negative sense). In this sense, mutatis mutandis, Gramsci’s 
understanding can be compared with the contemporary reflections by Weber on the 
growing bureaucratisation of modern mass societies.35 
More generally speaking, in Gramsci’s time, bureaucracy represents a pivotal 
instrument to bind political society and civil society; from a certain point of view, it 
embodies the “totalitarian” unity of the contemporary regimes. 
6. Police and police-like apparatuses
A similar “enlargement” characterises also the category of the police, as it emerges 
again in Notebook 14.36 In § 34, Gramsci writes: “It is difficult to deny that all political 
parties (those of subordinate as well as ruling groups) also carry out a policing function 
34Q 14, § 69, 1732; my translation.
35Cf. in this regard, the fascinating analysis by Juan Carlos Portantiero (1981). 
However, the Weberian influence on the socio-political theory of the Notebooks should 
not be overestimated. In fact, Gramsci had a limited and mediated (by Michels) 
knowledge of the thought of Weber. Moreover, an important role in defining Gramsci’s 
conception of bureaucracy may have been played by other sources (cf. in particular 
Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire). 
36As Guido Liguori points out, the extension of the category of police runs in parallel 
to the enlargement of the concept of state (cf. the entry Polizia in Liguori-Voza 2009, 
651-652). 
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– that is to say, the function of safeguarding a certain political and legal order”.37 The 
progressive or regressive meaning of this action is defined by Gramsci on the basis of 
the relationship between the party and the “old” and “new” social forces. As a 
consequence, he concludes that if the political party “is progressive it functions 
‘democratically’ (democratic centralism)”, then it can be defined as such.38 When, 
instead, it “functions ‘bureaucratically’ (bureaucratic centralism)” it does not represent a
party any more.39 “The party in this second case is a simple, unthinking executor. It is 
then technically a policing organism, and its name of “political party” is simply a 
metaphor of a mythological character”.40 Such a description is of absolute interest, last 
but not least for the connection with the above mentioned categories of “bureaucracy” 
and “democracy” and for the observations on the changing nature of the political party. 
Gramsci deals more directly with the issue of the police in a note contained in Notebook
2, but closely connected to the text of Notebook 14 previously quoted.41 Here he affirms
that if the term police does not stop defining the “public service designed for the 
repression of crime”,42 it describes also all those organisations that control and ‘contain’ 
the social body:
[the police] is certainly not just that particular official organization which is 
juridically recognized and empowered to carry out the public function of 
37Q 14, § 34; Gramsci 1999, 363.
38Q 14, § 34; Gramsci 1999, 364.
39Q 14, § 34; Gramsci 1999, 364.
40Q 14, § 34; Gramsci 1999, 364.
41The text is a single draft written in January 1933 (cf. Cospito 2011). Q 14, § 34 is 
dated January-February 1933. That means that Q 2, § 150 is more or less contemporary 
to Q 14, § 34 (it is hard to say if Q 2, § 150 precedes or follows Q 14, § 34). 
42Q 13, § 27; Gramsci 1999, 466.
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public safety, as it is normally understood. This organism is the central and 
formally responsible nucleus of the ‘police’, which is a much larger 
organization in which a large part of a state’s population participates directly
or indirectly through links that are more or less precise and limited, 
permanent or occasional, etc.43 
And he concludes that “the analysis of these relations, much more than many 
philosophical juridical dissertations help one understand what the ‘state’ is”.44 
This account of the police reflects clearly the new features of politics in the modern 
world. It sheds a meaningful light on the relationship between coercion and consensus, 
domination and direction: if the coercive aspect does not fail (whence, for instance, the 
indirect reference to repression in Q 2, § 150), the decisive element can only be the 
consensus, due to the impossibility to control the politicised masses and due to the 
increasing weight of the superstructures. However, as said before, this hegemony is 
different from that of the expansive phase of the capitalist-bourgeois world. It is rather 
ambiguously “totalising”, as it aims to involve the people within the political project of 
the ruling class, and, at the same time, to repress all the potential forms of subversion 
and of autonomy, as well as to ban the conception of the world alternative to that of the 
dominant group. 
7. Towards a new discipline
43Q 2, § 150; Gramsci 1992, 361.
44Q 2, § 150; Gramsci 1992, 361.
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Given this analysis, it might seem that civil society, state, party, etc. are out-of-date 
categories and that there is no escape from this totalitarian order. Neither the working 
class movement nor its political strategies seem to be adequate to the new situation. 
Gramsci, however, does not limit his analysis to the negative aspects of the actual state 
of things, but, on the contrary, he never loses his commitment to the socialist revolution.
In the notebooks here analysed, extremely realistic observations on the current situation 
are intermingled with proposals for the creation of a new communist party, as the 
premise for a radical transformation of state and society.
In this respect, a key-word is without a doubt the term of “discipline”. Various notes are 
devoted to the analysis of this category, whose meaning is summarised by Gramsci in Q 
14, § 48. Here he writes:
How should one understand discipline, if what is intended by this word is 
the continuous and permanent relation between rulers and ruled that realises 
the collective will? Certainly not like a passive and supine welcoming of 
orders, not like the mechanical execution of a duty, but rather as a conscious
and clear assimilation of orders to be realised. Thus the discipline does not 
cancel personality in an organic sense, but only limits the arbitrary and 
irresponsible impulsivity, not to speak of the illusory vanity of emerging.45 
“Discipline” is therefore opposed by Gramsci to “individual whim” and “impulsivity”, 
while it is similar to “self-control”, “responsibility” and also (true) “liberty” (from this 
point of view, § 48 is related to Q 14, § 61, on spontaneity and discipline, and to Q 15, §
45Q 14, § 48, 1706; my translation.
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46, where Gramsci gives the example of discipline in the university system).46 
Interestingly, Gramsci explains it through a parallel with the combination of 
predestination and free will in the religious sphere.47 
This conception of discipline is closely connected to democracy. Indeed, if “authority is 
a specialised technical function and not an ‘arbitrariness’ or an extrinsic and external 
imposition, discipline is a necessary element of democratic order, of freedom. 
Specialised technical function will be to say when authority is exercised in a socially (or
nationally) homogeneous group; when it is exercised by a group on another group, the 
discipline will be autonomous and free for the first, but not for the second”.48
This reflection evokes the issue of the relationship between rulers and ruled. In a truly 
democratic perspective, according to Gramsci, even a decision “from above” can be 
acceptable; furthermore, even if wrong, such a decision could be better, within certain 
46The theme of discipline returns in Gramsci’s thought, as he has dealt with it already 
in the 1920s (cf. for instance McNally 2008). For a survey of Gramsci’s usages of the 
concept both in the pre-prison writings and in the Prison Notebooks, cf. the entry 
Disciplina (by L. La Porta) in Liguori-Voza 2009 (however, La Porta does not stress the 
new importance of the category in the last phase of Gramsci’s reflection). 
47Cf. the following passage: “even the concept of ‘predestination’ proper to some 
currents of Christianity does not annul so-called ‘free will’ in the Catholic conception, 
since the individual accepts ‘willingly’ the divine will (as Manzoni poses the question in
the Pentecoste), which, it is true, he could not oppose, but with which he collaborates 
(or not) with all his moral forces. Therefore, discipline does not annul the personality 
and freedom: the question of ‘personality and freedom’ arises not from the fact of 
discipline, but from the ‘origin of the power that orders discipline’” (Q 14, § 48, 1706; 
my translation). The parallelism between politics and religion is significant. On the 
human level, the counterpart of the divine will is represented by the political and social 
ideals embodied by the political party. There are also evident differences, though: while 
the divine will is transcendent (and, therefore, “given forever”), in politics and society 
the values are continuously discussed and reassessed, and they are the result of an 
endless process of creation of hegemony (cf. in this regard Gramsci’s crucial 
observations on the concept of ‘immanence’; see on this point Frosini 2010, 112 ff.). 
48Q 14, § 48, p. 1707; my translation.
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limits, than an autonomous and in itself fairer choice. In this context, Gramsci’s 
observations on a possible balance between autonomy and conformity are meaningful. 
It is clear also that, thanks to this formula of “liberating conformism” (that is, in its very
essence, Gramsci’s conception of discipline) Gramsci is reassessing and expanding a 
traditional communist dogma. Such an innovative approach allows him to dwell on the 
issue of the political party and to imagine a possible, successful path for communism in 
the contemporary framework.
8. The political party between ideal and reality
As a matter of fact, the essential condition for the “moral and intellectual reform”49 of 
contemporary societies desired by Gramsci is a radical renewal of the party, as to its 
structure and, above all, to its spirit. These observations clearly evoke Gramsci’s 
conception of the “modern prince”, as it unfolds mainly in Notebook 13.50 
I would argue that his reflections on the nature of political organisations contained in 
the miscellaneous notebooks 14, 15 and 17 deepen this central element of the Prison 
Notebooks; at the same time, however, they seem to adopt a new approach to the issues 
embedded in this formula, in so far as Gramsci aims to return here to the ‘basics’ of 
politics – cf. in this perspective his observations on democracy and centralism that have 
already been mentioned, but also his fundamental reflections on the “legislator”.51 
49On this formula, elaborated by Gramsci before his imprisonment, cf. Rolfini 1990, 
Rapone 2011 and Fonseca 2016. 
50Gramsci’s conception of the “modern prince” has been extensively debated by 
scholars. An old but still valid point of view on this issue is represented by Paggi 1970; 
for contemporary analyses, cf. in particular Thomas 2009, Thomas 2013 and Thomas 
2015. 
51The theme of the “legislator” is developed in particular in Q 14, §§ 9 and 13 (but 
Gramsci hints at this figure also in § 32 of Notebook 14 and in Q 2, § 150). As already 
seen with the categories of bureaucracy and police, this concept has to be understood 
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The most meaningful note in this sense is no doubt § 70 of Notebook 14. This long text 
deepens the tripartite conception of the party developed by Gramsci from the pre-prison 
writings onward, by investigating the conditions for the successful establishment of a 
political organisation.52 
In opposition to other notes on the topic, where he focusses mainly on the intermediate 
element, here Gramsci deals mostly with the features of two extreme poles. In the first 
place, he affirms that the apparently oxymoronic combination of freedom and 
(self-)discipline (illustrated before) applies both to the base and to the head of the party, 
although with different degrees and in different forms. As to the masses, discipline is 
represented by loyalty to the group’s projects, i.e. by a new, positive “conformism” 
(Gramsci talks about “a mass element, composed of ordinary, average men, whose 
participation takes the form of discipline and loyalty”).53 For the party leadership, 
discipline means organising capacity (“this element is endowed with great cohesive, 
centralising and disciplinary powers”)54 and even creativity (“creative spirit or 
organisational ability”).55 If these conditions are fulfilled, a historical bloc will be 
realised and, ultimately, the transformation of the individuals will make possible the 
transformation of reality itself. 
also in a broader sense, as the “the set of beliefs, feelings, interests and reasonings 
spread in a community in a given historical period” (Q 14, § 9, 1663; my translation). In
short, the legislator embodies a legislative activity that goes beyond its specific 
political-juridical limits, in order to (re)shape the political and social community as a 
whole. In this perspective, it represents the counterpart of Gramsci’s reflection on the 
party sketched here. In this perspective cf. also, mutatis mutandis, Coutinho 2000. 
52On Gramsci’s tripartite scheme, cf. Showstack Sassoon 1987, 150-79.
53Q 14, § 70; Gramsci 1999, 360. 
54Q 14, § 70; Gramsci 1999, 360. 
55Q 14, § 70; Gramsci 1999, 360. 
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Furthermore, he adds that it is a duty of the leading group to involve the party’s base in 
its political project. That is essential in order to avoid that a party will be destroyed by 
“normal means” (this formula returns also in the title of the text,  Machiavelli. When 
one can say that a party has been formed and it cannot be destroyed with normal 
means, and hints at the troubled times in which Gramsci lives, in which the parties are 
rather destroyed by the authoritarian regimes with “unorthodox” means, e.g. through the
assassination or imprisonment of their members – the reference to Gramsci’s own 
experience is clear). The survival of an “endangered” party occurs to the extent that the 
leadership is able to envisage the “defeat in the struggle” and to prepare its successors, 
by leaving them an ideological and moral “legacy” from which the party can be reborn 
(“it should leave as its heritage a ferment from which it [the party] may be recreated”).56
This peculiar combination of “realism” and “idealism” is fascinating and it shows how 
pivotal the issue of the political party is in the framework of Gramsci’s last political 
reflections. Such a theme would require a much more extended analysis, that cannot be 
provided here. It should be remembered, however, that Gramsci deals extensively in the 
notebooks 14, 15 and 17 with the nature of past and present political parties, both in a 
historical and in a theoretical perspective.57 He focuses also on their “sectarian” 
features;58 he investigates the current crisis of parliamentarism in Europe and he dwells 
on so-called “black parliamentarism”.59 
56Q 14, § 70; Gramsci 1999, 361. 
57See in this regard especially Q 14, §§ 3, 10 and 53, but also Q 15, §§ 2, 4 and 62. 
58Cf. in particular Q 15, §§ 4 and 55.
59On the crisis of parliamentarism, cf. Q 15, §§ 47 and 48; on “black parliamentarism”, 
cf. Q 14, §§ 75, 76, 77 and 78. The formula “black parliamentarism” describes a form of
parliamentarism that is not formally established; Gramsci reflection on this topic is 
strictly connected to his (highly problematic) judgement of the growing authoritarian 
tendencies in USSR – on this complex theme cf. the hints contained in Cospito 2016, 
73-75. 
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9. Conclusions
To conclude, it is clear that behind Gramsci’s general observations on categories such as
bureaucracy, police, discipline and, of course, political party, there is a penetrating 
analysis of the alarming political, social and economical dynamics in Italy and Europe, 
as well as a reflection of the transformations of socialism on a global level. 
As I have tried to demonstrate, against the background of the dramatic situation of the 
1930s, Gramsci’s political reflections acquire a further depth. The peculiar combination 
of a “pessimistic” reflection on the actual authoritarian regimes with an “optimistic” 
commitment to their possible overthrow allows Gramsci to offer an intriguing insight 
into the complex dynamics of twentieth-century politics, highlighting the 
interconnection of consent and control, agreement and coercion, whose combination, 
according to him, represents the very “essence” of modernity. 
Although necessarily partial and synthetic, I think that this recognition of the political 
notes of miscellaneous notebooks 14, 15 and 17 contributes in shedding light on some 
unexplored paths in Gramsci’s thought, that deserve much closer attention. In particular,
I aimed to show that in these notebooks a “new” conception of politics (in opposition to 
the “old-style”, “nineteenth-century” model) stands out. Gramsci outlines here a 
political system characterised by “totalitarian” features, a system in which the state 
adopts “unconventional” strategies in order to maintain control over civil society, and in
which the very nature of the party is changed. At the same time, however, he also 
sketches a “new” political alternative to this reactionary scenario, which goes through a 
radical reassessment of politics itself. In this framework, it is interesting to compare this
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reflection with the theme of the “costituente”, which is sometimes evoked by Gramsci, 
i.e. a “constituent”, democratic assembly that could oppose the Fascist dictatorship and 
lead to the overthrow of the regime.60 
Moreover, I would argue that such a reading of the Prison Notebooks can contribute, to 
a certain extent, also to reflect on our present-day political issues, since they still relate 
to debates on the nature and on the usefulness of parties, on the transformations of the 
mechanisms of political participation, and on new forms of political engagement. 
Mutatis mutandis, the themes of the control of the state over society, of the relationship 
between politics and culture, and so on, are sadly more central today than they have 
been in decades and represent one of the major challenges of contemporary politics both
on the national and on the global level. 
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